US Interventions in Iran and Venezuela: Opportunism, Not Grand Strategy
Matheus de Freitas Cecílio
Key Takeaways:
US interventions in Venezuela and Iran reflect opportunistic timing rather than a coordinated strategy to counter China
Energy disruption risk is elevated, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, with potential spillover effects across Asian markets
China remains exposed to global oil shocks despite significant reserves and short-term mitigation measures
Beijing’s electrification drive is a long-term strategy to reduce structural dependence on volatile external energy sources
Net effect: short-term instability may challenge China, but current dynamics ultimately reinforce its long-term strategic position
The first quarter of 2026 has seen a sharp escalation in US external engagement, marked by rapid intervention in Venezuela and sustained military confrontation with Iran. While the operation in Caracas delivered a swift outcome, the situation in the Gulf has evolved into a far more complex and protracted conflict. On 7 April, the United States and Iran agreed to a conditional two-week ceasefire, brokered with significant diplomatic involvement from Pakistan, which also included provisions for reopening the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz; the durability of this pause remains uncertain and underlying tensions persist.
In Iran, early hopes among some US policymakers of a quick decapitation strategy giving way to compliant successors have not materialised. Following the targeted killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in late February and the appointment of his son Mojtaba Khamenei as successor, Iran’s leadership has signalled continued resistance and strategic caution, with the temporary ceasefire reflecting a pause rather than a resolution to hostilities.
These developments have drawn attention to their place within the broader US–China strategic landscape. Both Venezuela and Iran have historically positioned themselves in opposition to US influence while maintaining close ties with Beijing, particularly in the energy domain. This has fuelled speculation that Washington’s actions form part of a wider effort to undermine China’s external partnerships and energy security.
Chinese Response and Risk Management
In the context of the so-called US–China strategic competition, Venezuela and Iran have been important energy suppliers for Beijing, particularly for independent refiners seeking discounted crude. According to industry estimates, China imported around 1.38 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian crude in 2025, equivalent to roughly 13-14% of its total crude oil imports by sea, making Tehran one of its most significant external sources. At the same time, imports of sanctioned Venezuelan crude added further volumes, with sanctioned barrels from Iran, Venezuela and Russia collectively accounting for over 22% of China’s total crude imports in 2025. If flows from Tehran and Caracas were to suddenly dry up, China would need to secure alternative supplies for a substantial portion of its crude import needs. These barrels have often traded at a discount relative to non-sanctioned crude, reflecting the impact of sanctions and financial restrictions on Iran and Venezuela’s access to global markets.
It is also worth noting that Beijing’s ties with both Venezuela and Iran extended beyond energy. China has developed deep economic links with Venezuela across politics, trade, infrastructure and finance, with Chinese policy banks among the largest creditors to Caracas and Beijing purchasing a majority of Venezuelan oil exports. In Iran’s case, Beijing and Tehran signed a 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2021 that envisaged extensive cooperation and up to USD 400 billion in investment across energy, infrastructure and other sectors, although the full scale and pace of implementation have been uneven.
As these US interventions unfolded, attention shifted to China’s response and its broader approach to risk management. Speculation arose around potential Chinese engagement, whether direct or indirect, driven in part by a tendency to interpret China through a Western alliance lens. However, this framing is misleading. Unlike the United States and NATO system, China’s external relationships are not structured around formal defence commitments or direct intervention. This reflects a broader analytical gap. Much of the “Second Cold War” framing assumes a level of bloc-based confrontation that does not accurately capture the nature of China’s global engagement. Beijing’s approach is more selective, economically driven, and calibrated to avoid direct military entanglement. As a result, expectations of a clear “tit-for-tat” response to US actions risk overestimating both China’s willingness and its strategic incentives to engage in proxy-style confrontation.
Energy dependence remains a structural vulnerability for Beijing. However, China’s sustained push toward electrification is a deliberate effort to reduce that exposure. The direction of travel is clear: China is positioning itself as an “electrostate”, gradually insulating its economy from global oil shocks through large-scale investment in electrification, renewables, and grid infrastructure. While significant dependencies remain, China is already one of the most advanced players globally in this transition.
Alongside its long-term shift toward electrification, Beijing has strengthened its short- and medium-term energy security posture. China holds substantial strategic crude reserves, with estimates placing onshore stockpiles at around 1.2 billion barrels, equivalent to roughly 100 days of seaborne import cover according to US Congressional assessments. In parallel, Beijing has moved to restrict refined fuel exports, aiming to stabilise domestic supply and pre-empt price volatility. Chinese refiners also have access to significant commercial inventories, further cushioning short-term shocks. However, despite these measures, China remains heavily dependent on imported oil and continues to be the world’s largest crude importer. As a result, sustained disruption in global oil markets would still carry material economic consequences for Beijing.
Possible Scenarios
Nevertheless, even as Chinese planners may view their energy system as increasingly resilient, sustained disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would still have significant implications for global oil markets. The strait remains one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, with a large share of Gulf exports flowing through it to Asia. At the time of writing, the United States has called on partners to support efforts to ensure continued passage through the strait, though international response has been limited. Meanwhile, diplomatic activity has intensified following weeks of escalating tensions, yielding a two-week ceasefire on April 7th, temporarily de-escalating hostilities and opening the door for further negotiations. Iran has indicated that safe passage could be maintained under this framework, contingent on the continuation of talks, with further discussions expected to follow.
However, operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz presents significant military and strategic challenges. The confined geography of the strait limits the effectiveness of large-scale naval deployments and creates favourable conditions for asymmetric tactics. This has been highlighted in past military simulations, including the US “Millennium Challenge” exercise, which underscored the difficulties conventional forces face when confronted with unconventional maritime strategies. In a real-world scenario, Iranian forces could leverage small vessels, coastal missile systems, and other asymmetric capabilities to complicate any attempt to secure or control passage. This introduces a high degree of operational risk for any actor seeking to enforce freedom of navigation in the strait, and limits the likelihood of a straightforward military solution.
While the US and Israel have demonstrated a degree of air superiority across the wider theatre, Iran retains meaningful capabilities through its missile and drone arsenal. Any escalation in the Gulf would also carry wider regional consequences, particularly for Asian economies such as South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, which are highly exposed to oil price volatility. The IEA warns that the looming energy crisis has the potential to be the ‘worst in history’
Importantly, there is little evidence that US actions in Venezuela and Iran form part of a coordinated strategy to counter China. While some analysts frame these developments through a “Second Cold War” lens, official positions within the US remain inconsistent, and broader geopolitical signalling points to a more fragmented decision-making process. As such, these interventions are better understood as opportunistic responses to shifting regional conditions rather than a unified strategic campaign against Beijing.
In the Middle East, recent developments have created a window of opportunity for US and Israeli engagement. The distraction of Russian forces in Ukraine, combined with the degradation of Iranian proxies and demonstrated Israeli military capabilities, has shifted the regional balance. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, sustained external engagement can serve to deflect attention from internal political pressures while reinforcing Israel’s strategic position. More broadly, Israel is seeking to capitalise on current US military dominance in the region while it remains available, particularly as regional dynamics gradually shift towards a more multipolar balance. At the same time, the broader transition towards a more multipolar regional order is encouraging regional actors to pursue objectives while current power asymmetries persist.
Looking ahead, the most likely near-term outcome is a managed settlement. The April ceasefire and subsequent talks suggest that both sides are seeking to avoid uncontrolled escalation, even as tensions remain high. Any future agreement is likely to involve negotiated arrangements around maritime security and energy flows, rather than a decisive resolution to the broader confrontation.
For China, the strategic picture remains broadly stable. Beijing continues to prioritise electrification and renewable energy as part of its long-term risk mitigation strategy, while maintaining access to diversified oil imports, including discounted Russian crude. Although short-term volatility may persist, China is well positioned to absorb shocks relative to other major import-dependent economies.
Overall, the current trajectory points towards prolonged instability rather than decisive outcomes. US and Israeli objectives in the region remain subject to operational and political constraints, while China’s long-term position continues to be reinforced by structural trends in energy, trade, and global demand for renewable technologies.