8 Unconventional Endgames for the War in Ukraine
Ben Thompson & Ben Goddard
Key Takeaways:
The war in Ukraine remains a frozen conflict with no clear victor, prompting the exploration of unconventional and complex scenarios beyond outright military victory.
Regime change in Russia appears unlikely in the near term due to Putin’s strong grip on power and risks of escalation, while Western support for Ukraine, though robust, faces potential long-term political challenges.
Economic and military pressures—including targeted strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, secondary sanctions on key trade partners, and plans to leverage frozen Russian assets—are central to Ukraine’s strategy to weaken Russia over time.
The risk of escalation remains significant, with grey-zone warfare continuing in Europe and NATO’s indirect involvement edging closer to potential direct confrontation, underscoring the fragile balance between deterrence and wider conflict.
Introduction
Nearly four years on, the war in Ukraine remains frozen. Neither side looks capable of a decisive victory, and the frontlines have solidified into a long war of attrition. With the conflict unlikely to be “won” outright by either side, attention is turning to how it might end.
As the conflict endures, analysts continue to explore how an eventual settlement might emerge — through negotiation, attrition, or systemic change. While the range of possible outcomes is vast, several ideas have repeatedly surfaced in expert debates. None are predictions, but each highlights an unconventional way the war could shift course as traditional paths to victory fade.
Idea 1 - Regime Change
The prospect of regime change in Russia has long occupied the minds of strategists and observers, yet the conditions for it remain severely limited. The most tangible attempt in recent memory came in June 2023, when Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group openly challenged the Kremlin. The brief mutiny highlighted fissures within Russia’s security apparatus and offered a rare glimpse of vulnerability at the heart of the regime. Yet, the revolt ultimately collapsed within days, left the political status quo intact and underscored the resilience of Vladimir Putin’s hold on power.
Even before Wagner’s rebellion, the structural barriers to regime change had been formidable. Russia’s security services remain deeply entrenched, elite loyalty is carefully managed, and public support for the leadership—though nuanced—still provides a buffer against sudden upheaval. The Kremlin’s prioritisation of the war in Ukraine has also pulled attention and resources away from domestic security, creating vulnerabilities in areas such as terrorism, border defence, and the uncertain succession in Chechnya, where power remains heavily personalised under Ramzan Kadyrov. These gaps expose dormant risks but do not, as yet, translate into immediate political collapse.
Any effort to instigate regime change would require precise coordination and extraordinary risk from European and U.S. intelligence services over an extended period—something unprecedented in modern history. Russia’s tightly controlled information environment and history of suppressing dissent make such undertakings highly challenging. The potential for unintended escalation, including nuclear risks, further limits the viability of such strategies.
The Wagner episode illustrated both the potential and profound limitations of regime change. While the rebellion briefly exposed fragility in the system, its failure reinforced that Moscow’s leadership remains insulated from rapid internal overthrow. No clear successor to Vladimir Putin has emerged, and any future transition could either maintain the current strategic course, intensify Russia’s engagement in Ukraine, or bring unexpected shifts in domestic and foreign policy. Overall, the likelihood of regime change in the near term, outside of health-related developments, remains very low.
Idea 2 - Loss of U.S./NATO Support for Ukraine
Tensions between Kyiv and Washington peaked earlier this year when President Trump clashed with Volodymyr Zelensky over aid oversight and alleged corruption within Ukraine’s defence sector. Trump’s calls for greater “burden-sharing” among NATO members briefly disrupted the flow of U.S. assistance, unsettling allies and prompting fears of waning Western resolve. European leaders, aware that any shift in U.S. commitment could tilt the balance of the war, responded by stepping up coordination and aid pledges to maintain strategic continuity.
In recent weeks, however, there has been a marked reinforcement of support. During his visit to London in late-October, Zelensky met with over twenty European leaders — including UK PM Keir Starmer — to secure fresh support packages and explore options for a negotiated resolution. European backing for Kyiv remains firm, while U.S. engagement has strengthened in the latter part of the year, driven in part by Trump’s frustration with Putin and the lack of progress toward a negotiated deal. Reporting indicates that the U.S. has discreetly shared intelligence to help Kyiv plan long‑range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, and Ukrainian forces have employed UK‑supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles on cross‑border strikes — developments the administration has described only cautiously in public.
Still, the durability of Western backing will depend on how the conflict evolves. Should negotiations over concessions arise, or if the conflict drags on for several more years, European and U.S. political appetite could gradually erode. In such a scenario, Western policy may pivot toward containment rather than decisive engagement — sustaining Ukraine’s defences enough to endure, but stopping short of enabling a full victory.
Idea 3 - U.S.-brokered peace deal
With the conflict in Ukraine locked in a grinding stalemate, one of the most talked-about exit routes is a U.S.-brokered settlement. Washington has already begun holding separate talks with Russia and Ukraine, suggesting temporary ceasefires and agreements to keep shipping routes open in the Black Sea.
However, recent analysis shows that such a peace deal is unlikely in the near term as neither Russia nor Ukraine appears willing to pursue one. Russia remains unwilling to give up the territory it has taken, while Ukraine refuses to accept any deal that means giving up land or weakening its security. Kyiv insists it will keep fighting until its borders are fully restored.
In theory, the U.S. could push for a “freeze” — a deal that stops the fighting and leaves both sides holding the ground they currently control. Ukraine would remain independent, but Russia would keep parts of the territory it occupies. The plan might also delay Ukraine’s entry into NATO and tie Western financial aid to compliance. This would stop large battles, let Ukraine rebuild, and give Russia a way to save face.
But this would still mean Ukraine accepting a compromise on its sovereignty and goals — something Kyiv is very unlikely to agree to unless it trusts the U.S. to stay firmly committed and believes it’s negotiating from a strong position.
In short, while a U.S.-brokered peace deal remains one of the less likely options, it is still talked about because it offers a way to pause the war without a clear winner. Whether it ever happens depends on how committed the U.S. is, whether Ukraine might change its stance, what Russia decides, if Europe supports the deal, and whether any security guarantees are reliable.
Idea 4 - Unfreezing and utilisation of Russian assets
The European Union and UK have discussed a preliminary plan for a new ‘reparations loan initiative’ to help increase funds for Ukraine, a process of financially engineering the frozen assets of the Russian Federation. The value of Russia’s sanctioned financial assets sequestered within the European financial network is up to USD 300 billion. The majority of Russian Central Bank assets (gold and foreign-exchange reserves) are held in the Euroclear Bank in Brussel, Belgium. The plan to financially reinstate EUR 140-165 billion worth of securities in the form of an interest-free loan to Kyiv, with conditions stating the ‘loan would be repaid only if Russia compensated Ukraine for damages caused during the war’. The objective would be to utilise sedentary Russian assets without claiming them outright, whilst expanding Ukraine’s military capacity drastically.
However, certain European Union representatives have expressed concerns for this strategy, arguing the confiscation of sovereign assets could reflect a breach in international laws. In addition, the Kremlin has responded with a myriad of counter-threats. Putin claimed there is no distinction between ‘theft’ and re-distribution of Russian financial assets, backed by Dmitri Medvedev, stating Russia will pursue justice with ‘all possible international and national courts’, and ‘in some cases, even out of court’. In extension, Putin threatens to further seize foreign/Western assets and companies within Russia and either sell them off or issue loans against them.
Moving forward, the process to finalise a contract which permits the unfreezing of Russian assets must be made with staunch consideration of the short-term versus long-term implications. In the short-term, freeing up assets within the European banking system to fund Ukraine’s economy during the conflict reduces demand from European financial institutions but will not afford them a long-term financial solution. In extension, this tactic is likely to be met with an increase in Russian aggression in both Ukraine and European counterparts, and may weaken the prospects for Western-led peace negotiations.
Idea 5 - Increased strikes/destruction of Russian oil revenue
Since early 2024, Ukraine has intensified its campaign of targeted strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, employing long-range drones often guided by U.S. intelligence. According to an Open Source Centre report, there have been around 300 drone attacks across 58 Russian oil refineries and stations, storage deposits and export terminals, up to 2000km into Russian territory. These military logistics operations have aimed to cause energy shortages, harm revenues, and subsequently, de-accelerate the conflict. Although sending sophisticated one-way drones is a costly method, the impact on Russian energy supplies has been significant.
Within the last 18 months, the financial knock-on effect has been recognisable in three main ways. Firstly, shortages in Russian energy supplies increased domestic gasoline prices by 9.5% and Diesel 3.5%, and even caused rations in occupied regions of Ukraine. However, these price changes are influenced by a combination of factors including sanctions, global oil market fluctuations, and domestic supply challenges. Secondly, drone strikes have hindered Russia’s refining capacity by peaks of 17-21% (around 1.4 million barrels per day), forcing a greater export of un-refined crude oil at a lower value. Thirdly, re-construction and repairs to energy facilities are likely to have cost up to ‘tens of billions of dollars’ - a highly expensive and very labour-intensive process.
The impact of these targeted attacks may cause disturbances in energy trade, but within the last decade, major shareholders amongst the Russian oil and gas sector have proven their ability to swiftly restructure production and sustain exports. At the same time, the mantra of Russian political elites declares the deceleration of oil exports will not reflect in their attitudes to war, and will continue to re-finance the economy through privatisation projects and maneuvers within the financial-capital market to subsidise reductions in energy revenues.
Idea 6 - Huge secondary sanctions package on India, China etc
Russia is the most sanctioned country in the world. Most sanctions and export restrictions are enforced by a coalition of G7 and E.U member states – with a deep focus on energy resources, the historical backbone of Russian trade. Despite this, Russia remains the third largest oil producer in the world.
At the UN General Assembly in New York (September 2025), Zelensky pressed Trump and European allies to enforce a new package of stronger sanctions on Moscow, while advancing ‘secondary sanctions’ for nations continuing to trade with Russia, and ultimately, help fund Putin’s war economy. More specifically, in 2024, 70% of Russian crude oil exports were directed to China and India alone, with Turkey, as Russia’s largest importer of refined oil.
In August 2025, U.S. sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, the two largest oil companies in Russia, were imposed and are expected to reduce export volumes and further squeeze the Kremlin’s energy revenues. Plus, additional secondary sanctions, stated as ‘Cumulative 50% U.S. Tariff on Most Indian Goods’, which has been lobbied by Trump to the E.U to increase to 100% and extended to Chinese imports. Meanwhile, the E.U president Ursula von de Leyen, has proposed ‘12 Chinese and 3 Indian entities’ added to a list of prohibited businesses and would receive transaction bans.
Western states briefly contemplated implementing broader trade regulations, speculating that secondary sanctions would pull India and China towards the West or push them further into Russian trade partnership. As a result, recent reports have indicated, both Chinese and Indian crude oil imports are expected to comply with U.S sanctions, and sharply cut their supplies from Lukoil and Rosneft, gradually reducing energy demands. Yet, there is no certain outcome for the level of impact on Russian energy supplies and global oil prices, there will inevitably be a knock-on effect.
Idea 7 - Long-term grey zone warfare with static territorial dispute
In terms of territorial gains and losses, Russia has been losing its momentum compared to the early stages of the conflict. By the end of the first year of the conflict, Russia had expanded its occupation of Ukrainian territory from 5-6% pre-conflict to approximately 18%. In the last 3 and a half years, while Russia has managed to keep Ukraine on the back-foot, Ukraine has successfully managed to reclaim territory, causing dynamic shifts in controlled areas - especially across Eastern and Southern regions (such as Luhansk, Donetsk and Kharkiv). As a result, in 2023 and 2024 Russia has made marginal net-gains of around 1-2% per year. By August 2025, various reports indicate occupied land totals 20%. While this still accounts for a huge amount of occupied space (117, 200km²), it also demonstrates Russia’s pace has plateaued, producing a largely static battlefield, as it continues to wrestle with its shrinking economy.
Whilst the Ukrainian armed forces have successfully decelerated Russian occupation, an increasing number of ‘grey-zone’ warfare incidents have occurred between Russia and the broader European security network. The term grey-zone refers to ‘hostile activity below the threshold of direct, state on state conflict, designed to coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function’, blurring the line between war and peace. The British MOD’s 2025 ‘Strategic Defence Review’ highlights the multi-dimensional attributes of Russia’s ‘hybrid’ activities, ranging from sabotage of critical infrastructure, vandalism of pipelines, targeted assassination, shadow fleets, GPS jamming, drone surveillance – these are some physical examples. Amongst various non-physical activities, such as cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and hacking operations. A report by RUSI stated ‘over 200 incidents suspected of Russian hybrid warfare in Europe between 2014-2024’, with 86% taking place post-2022. However, one of the most powerful elements behind this form of warfare is the ability for Russian military and intelligence services to deny and contradict accusations.
Under intensifying threat, NATO and EU member states have responded by deepening regional cooperation, specifically within the Eastern Flank. In 2025 alone, two new joint defence projects, ‘Baltic Sentry’ and the ‘Eastern Sentry’ were formed, focusing on deeper coordination on airspace defence and naval intelligence. Plus, deeper efforts between European allies have been made to detect and debunk information-based attacks.
The balancing act of establishing a ‘proportionate’ response without engaging in direct state conflict outside of Ukraine needs to be carefully managed. There are several outcomes for a continuation of grey-zone warfare, one of which includes an escalated response amongst Ukraine’s allies, sourcing greater military aid and direct intervention.
Idea 8 - NATO pulled into conflict
While NATO has maintained that it is not a party to the war in Ukraine, the risk of direct involvement has quietly grown as Western military support deepens. What began as arms deliveries and intelligence sharing has evolved into coordinated training, logistics, and the provision of increasingly advanced systems. Each new stage blurs the line between indirect support and participation.
The most likely trigger for NATO’s entry into open conflict would be a serious incident — for instance, a Russian missile or drone striking NATO territory, or an attack on alliance personnel operating near the border. Incidents of Russian drones crossing into Polish and Romanian airspace have already caused alerts and jet scrambles, though no formal military response has yet been activated. Had such an event caused fatalities or significantly damaged NATO personnel or infrastructure, the political impetus to invoke Article 5 could become overwhelming.
Another potential source of escalation comes from Ukraine’s growing military cooperation with NATO. As the war continues, Ukrainian forces increasingly coordinate with NATO allies through joint training, intelligence sharing, and operational support. Moscow regularly claims that Western weapons and intelligence turn NATO into a “de facto” participant in the conflict — a narrative used to justify threats of pre-emptive or escalatory actions. This closer cooperation raises the risk of miscalculation or deliberate provocations that could trigger wider conflict.
If NATO were drawn in, even on a limited scale, the consequences would be enormous. Direct confrontation between the alliance and Russia would mark the first major-state conflict in Europe since 1945, likely extending well beyond Ukraine’s borders. For now, deterrence and containment remain the preferred strategy, but as the war grinds on, the boundary between restraint and engagement is becoming dangerously thin.
Conclusion
These eight unconventional factors reveal the complex and fragile nature of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Understanding the war’s trajectory requires a multi-dimensional perspective that goes beyond traditional military analysis. While Russia faces significant challenges in maintaining political stability and economic resilience, Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate a strong hold on power amid mounting pressures.
A decisive systemic shift is unlikely to stem from any single factor. Instead, Ukraine’s strategy relies on a combination of military pressure and financial measures—such as targeted drone strikes, secondary sanctions reducing energy revenues, Western financial aid, and deeper NATO cooperation—to incrementally weaken the Kremlin’s capacity and encourage a de-escalation of aggression.
Ultimately, the conflict’s resolution will likely depend on how these intertwined pressures evolve over time rather than on any quick or singular endgame.